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Shoot at Me Once: Shame on You!
Shoot at Me Twice: Qualified
Immunity. Qualified Immunity
Applies Where Police Target
Innocent Bystanders*
I. INTRODUCTION
Qualified immunity is a judicially created doctrine that has resulted
in expansive protections for lower-level state officials for constitutional
violations.1 Guidance from the Supreme Court of the United States
regarding the interpretation of "clearly established rights" has been
scarce and vague at best.2 As a result, district courts faced with
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what is familiar to me. I am in awe of not only what you have taught me, but of who you
are. To Professors Longan, Fleissner, and Gadkar-Wilcox, thank you for serving as
unofficial advisors on this casenote and offering up your wisdom and guidance for the
masses to experience. A final thank you to my loved ones who have supported my passion
for this project and encouraged me every step of the way.
1. Qualified immunity is an affirmative defense that cuts off liability for damages
caused by a lower-level official's exercise of discretionary authority. Procedurally, the
doctrine of immunity had to be proved and justified by the party asserting the doctrine.
With the creation of qualified immunity, the burden of proof has shifted from the
defendant to the plaintiff, i.e. plaintiffs must prove their own case along with why the
doctrine does not apply. See, e.g., Mercado v. City of Orlando, 407 F.3d 1152 (11th Cir.
2005).
2. See, e.g., Tyler Finn, Qualified Immunity Formalism: "Clearly Established Law"
and the Right to Record Police Activity, 119 COLUMBIA L. REV. 445 (2019) (highlighting
the difficulty in interpreting Supreme Court direction on qualified immunity and the
varying decisions of appellate courts as a result). The Supreme Court of the United States
held that for a right to be clearly established:
[t]he contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official
would understand that what he is doing violates that right. This is not to say
that an official action is protected by qualified immunity unless the very action
in question has previously been held unlawful, see Mitchell, supra, 472 U.S., at
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qualified immunity assertions regarding a § 1983 claim take a
restrictive approach to the doctrine's analysis often by relying on
factually similar cases from binding authorities. Historically, innocent
bystanders have had no clearly established right to be free from
excessive force where force was applied to subdue the target of the
arrest,3 but what if the force is intentionally applied to the innocent
bystander?
In 2019, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
determined in Corbitt v. Vickers4 that officers who target innocent
bystanders are entitled to qualified immunity.5 Previously, courts
evaluated the applicability of qualified immunity where officers exerted
force on the subject of the arrest. The decision in Corbitt v. Vickers
short-circuits legitimate claims against officers who use lethal force on
innocent bystanders complying with police commands. 6 The Eleventh
Circuit determined an innocent bystander's right to be free from
excessive force is not "clearly established."7 An officer can shoot a
complying bystander and enjoy the government shield of immunity. In a
country facing police shootings and brutality, such protections make
room for much more dangerous waves of lethal force application. As a
judicially created doctrine contradicting legislative intent, qualified
immunity already has an unstable justification. The judicial power to
fix all that is wrong with qualified immunity rests with the Supreme
Court—thanks to stare decisis.8
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
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535, n. 12, 105 S.Ct., at 2820, n. 12; but it is to say that in the light of
pre-existing law the unlawfulness must be apparent.
Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987) (citations omitted).
3. See, e.g., Schultz v. Braga, 455 F.3d 470 (4th Cir. 2006).
4. 929 F.3d 1304 (11th Cir. 2019).
5. See id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. See William Baude, Is Qualified Immunity Unlawful?, 106 CAL. L. REV. 45 (2018).
This Article explores qualified immunity under the three Supreme Court's justifications:
(1) a common law "good faith" derivative, (2) rectifying the putative broadening of § 1983,
and (3) fair warning for government officials, similar to the rule of lenity. Baude takes a
chisel to the three justifications finding that each crumble under critical analysis, yet
notes that the Supreme Court is unlikely to take the most straightforward approach—
overturning the doctrine as it lacks legal basis—because of stare decisis.
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Christopher Barnett was a criminal suspect wanted by the Coffee
County Sheriff's Department and the Georgia Bureau of Investigation.
On July 10, 2014, the agencies initiated an operation to capture the
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9. Vickers, 929 F.3d at 1308.
10. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012).
11. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
12. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
13. Vickers, 929 F.3d at 1308.
14. Corbitt v. Wooten, No. 5:16-CV-51, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 199826, at *18 (S.D.
Ga. Dec. 5, 2017), rev'd and remanded sub nom. The district court determined that
Vickers's assertion of qualified immunity would be better received at the summary
judgment stage of the case as opposed to the motion to dismiss phase given the way the
record appeared at that moment in the case—the case needed to proceed for factual
development. Id. Claims brought by other plaintiffs and against other officers were
dismissed. Id.
15. Id. at *5 (quoting Troupe v. Sarasota Cty., Fla., 419 F.3d 1160, (11th Cir. 2005)).
16. Id. at *12.
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suspect. During the course of the operation, Barnett wandered into the
area surrounding Plaintiff Amy Corbitt's yard, and the officers followed
in pursuit. Corbitt had never encountered Barnett or known of him
before this occurrence. One adult and six minors were in the yard,
including multiple children under the age of three. Corbitt and two
minors were inside the home. The officers ordered everyone in the yard
to get down. Officers handcuffed and held the children and their
supervising adult at gunpoint.9
The family dog, "Bruce," was present during the operation. At that
point, Officer Vickers—deputy sheriff for Coffee County—discharged his
firearm at Bruce, but the shot missed. It is undisputed that Bruce did
not pose a threat and was not aggressive, and no other officers made an
effort to subdue the dog. Bruce retreated under the house after the first
shot. After Bruce came out from under the house, Vickers fired at the
dog again. While the second shot missed Bruce, the bullet hit a
ten-year-old child lying eighteen inches in front of Vickers, who was
readily viewable by Vickers. The child, SDC, suffered medical and
mental trauma and currently receives ongoing treatment for both.
Corbitt, as SDC's parent and guardian, initiated a 42 U.S.C. § 198310
action against Vickers in his individual capacity, alleging violations of
the Fourth11 and Fourteenth12 Amendments regarding freedom from
excessive force. Vickers asserted qualified immunity as an affirmative
defense and filed a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. 13
The district court denied Vickers's motion. 14 To assess SDC's claim,
the court analyzed the two factors of an excessive force claim: "(1) that a
seizure occurred and (2) that the force used to effect the seizure was
unreasonable."15 Because Vickers intentionally stopped SDC's
movement and restricted his freedom, SDC was seized.16 Drawing
inferences most favorably to the Plaintiff, a jury could have decided that
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SDC's seizure was effectuated by Vickers's force against Bruce. 17
Because the subjects of the force were not the intended targets, the
district court considered and rejected Vickers' claim that force was per
se necessary, holding that Vickers had presented no evidence to support
his claim.18 Vickers appealed the denial of his motion to dismiss SDC's
complaint. The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court's decision
and remanded the case.19
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A.

Constitutional Amendments Regarding Seizures

The Fourth Amendment provides, in pertinent part, that: "the right
of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated . . . ."20 The Fourth Amendment has a longstanding history of
protecting against excessive force during seizures. 21 The protections are
compounded by the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment. The
Fourteenth Amendment provides, in pertinent part, that:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.22

The protections, together, target excessive force, invasion of personal
privacy, and liberty.23 An individual may bring a civil action for
42275-mcr_71-4 Sheet No. 136 Side B
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17. Id. at *11.
18. Id. at *17–*18. Further, the district court relied on Schutt v. Lewis, No.
6:12-cv-1697-Orl-37DAB, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110633 (M.D. Fla. 2014) (determining
that officer safety is typically the standard in animal shooting cases when evaluating the
reasonableness of the officer's conduct). See Cooper v. Rutherford, 503 F. App'x. 672 (11th
Cir. 2012) (analyzing whether an officer's decision to shoot at all was appropriate per the
exigencies of the case); see also Vaughan v. Cox, 343 F.3d 1323 (11th Cir. 2003) (granting
qualified immunity for an officer who intended to shoot the subject of the arrest but
struck an innocent bystander).
19. Vickers, 929 F.3d at 1307.
20. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
21. See, e.g., Mercado, 407 F.3d at 1158 (holding that a police officer who used deadly
force in a non-deadly situation has committed a Fourth Amendment violation); Thornton
v. City of Macon, 132 F.3d 1395 (11th Cir. 1998) (denying summary judgment on qualified
immunity assertion because an issue of fact existed regarding the nature of force used).
22. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
23. See, e.g., Graham v. Connor, 109 S.Ct. 1865 (1989) ("Claims that law enforcement
officials have used excessive force in the course of an arrest, investigatory stop, or other
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deprivation of such rights under Section 1983. Section 1983 provides
that persons who, under color of state authority, violate an individual's
constitutional rights will be liable for the injuries caused therefrom. 24
B.

Historical Interpretation and Application of Immunity as an
Affirmative Defense

1.
The Progenitor: Absolute Immunity
Absolute immunity originated in English common law and was
partially codified in the United States Constitution. 25 The Constitution
establishes absolute protection for legislators except in cases of treason,
felony, and breach of peace.26 Courts in the United States adapted the
doctrine to apply to elite government officials including legislators,
judges, the president, prosecutors, and executive officers engaged in
adjudicative functions.27 Essentially, the higher the official, the greater
the protection needed.28 The impetus of such protection is that elite
government officials' duties must not be materially impaired from
apprehension of or harassment by the public, given the number and
gravitas of decisions made by officials in their official capacity. 29
Further, the doctrine has been considered necessary to prevent courts
from becoming bogged down with artfully worded insubstantial or
frivolous lawsuits.30

05/29/2020 07:30:56

'seizure' of a free citizen are most properly characterized as invoking the protections of the
Fourth Amendment, which guarantees citizens the right 'to be secure in their persons . . .
against unreasonable seizures,' and must be judged by reference to the Fourth
Amendment's 'reasonableness' standard.").
24. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
25. See Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483, 498 (1896).
26. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1.
27. Spalding, 161 U.S. at 498. The president is entitled to absolute immunity from
suits for damages based on actions taken in official presidential capacity. Nixon v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982).
28. Spalding, 161 U.S. at 498.
29. See, e.g., id.
30. See id. at 499.
31. 416 U.S. 232 (1974) (overruled on other grounds).
32. Id. at 239.
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2.
The Progeny: Qualified Immunity
The doctrine of absolute immunity eventually produced a narrower
derivative in qualified immunity, the genesis of which traces back to
Scheuer v. Rhodes,31 which created qualified immunity for lower offices
of less prominent duties. 32 There, three students of Kent State
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University died after a confrontation with the National Guard, who
were immune from liability. The students' estates sought to hold the
governor of Ohio and various Ohio National Guard officials accountable
for the deaths.33 The Court recognized two codependent principles
which necessitated a milder form of immunity for government officials:
(1) the injustice, particularly in the absence of bad faith, of subjecting
to liability an officer who is required, by the legal obligations of his
position, to exercise discretion; (2) the danger that the threat of such
liability would deter his willingness to execute his office with the
decisiveness and the judgment required by the public good. 34

05/29/2020 07:30:56

33. Id. at 235.
34. Id. at 240.
35. Id. at 247–48.
36. 438 U.S. 478 (1978).
37. Id. at 505.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 512. Regarding the judicial checks set in place, jurors are carefully screened
prior to selection via voir dire; advocates will have their arguments openly contested by
adversaries during the judicial process; witnesses are subject to cross-examination under
the penalty of perjury; and judges' decisions are subject to appeal and scrutiny of
appellate courts. Id.
40. Id. at 506–07.
41. Id. at 507.
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Without precisely defining qualified immunity, the Court determined
that officials exercising good faith discretion deserve protection from
litigation commensurate with the level of discretion afforded to their
official capacities.35
This new doctrine was explored more thoroughly in Butz v.
Economou.36 There, the Court reasoned that an extension of absolute
immunity to all federal executive officials erodes basic constitutional
protections.37 The Court was concerned that, should officials not be held
liable for discretionary functions, the Constitution would provide no
redress, and federal officials would not be deterred from committing
constitutional wrongs.38 There are many checks on judges, jurors, and
prosecutors which allow for constitutional safeguards whilst upholding
absolute immunity, while lower officials may not be subjected to such
checks.39 The Court determined that lower-level officials' discretion
would not be hindered by an awareness of constitutional limits. 40
Therefore, qualified immunity should be afforded to lower-level officials,
however, the plaintiff's complaint must state a substantial claim for
relief to survive a motion to dismiss.41
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In Harlow v. Fitzgerald,42 qualified immunity was solidified as an
affirmative defense for state agents, effectively limiting absolute
immunity.43 The Court reasoned that because damages may be the only
realistic avenue for constitutional vindication,44 qualified immunity
"must be pleaded by a defendant official" as an affirmative defense. 45
Previously, an officer claiming qualified immunity (sometimes called
the "good faith defense") had to meet both an objective test and a
subjective test.46 The objective test "involves a presumptive knowledge
of and respect for 'basic, unquestioned constitutional rights.'"47 The
subjective test "refers to 'permissible intentions' [of the defendant
official]."48 If either element was not satisfied, the defense failed. 49 The
Court in Harlow noted that some courts consider a defendant official's
subjective good faith to be a fact necessitating resolution by a jury and
thus cannot be resolved on summary judgment. 50 The Court stripped
away the subjective element, creating a new objective-only standard
where "government officials performing discretionary functions
generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their
conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional
rights of which a reasonable person would have known." 51
The Eleventh Circuit, in Mercado v. City of Orlando,52 focused on
how plaintiffs can prove their rights were clearly established 53 when the
offense occurred.54 The court outlined three categories an individual
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42. 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
43. See id.
44. Id. at 809.
45. Id. at 815.
46. Id.
47. Id. (quoting Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 322 (1975)).
48. Id. (quoting Strickland, 420 U.S. at 322).
49. Id.
50. Id. at 816; see also, David Rudovsky, The Qualified Immunity Doctrine in the
Supreme Court: Judicial Activism and the Restriction of Constitutional Rights, 138 U. PA.
L. REV. 23 (1989). The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, per Rule 56, do not typically
allow resolution via summary judgment where there is a dispute of facts. Pre-Harlow, the
burden of proof and pleading qualified immunity was the defendant's, and subjective
intent must have been proven. Accordingly, trials had to proceed to determine the "fact" of
the defendant's subjective intent. When the Court in Harlow eliminated the subjective
element, qualified immunity issues were able to be decided before trial, most often at
summary judgment. Id. at 67–68.
51. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818.
52. 407 F.3d 1152 (11th Cir. 2005).
53. The wording used is consistently "established" not "defined." See id.
54. Id. at 1158–59.
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may use to make such a determination. 55 The first category includes
materially similar cases.56 In this category, cases cited by the plaintiff
need to contain materially analogous facts and must have been decided
before the government agent in the present case was required to
exercise discretion, thus giving the agent proper notice that the conduct
is unreasonable.57 The second category requires the plaintiff to
demonstrate that a clearly established and broader principle should
control the facts of the case.58 If there is no prior case on point, the
"'[g]eneral statements of the law contained within the Constitution,
statute, or caselaw may sometimes provide "fair warning" of unlawful
conduct.'"59 If the general statements of law clearly apply to the
scenario before the court, the officers would have been considered to
have notice before using excessive force.60
The third category is an exception to the other two. 61 There, an agent
must demonstrate that the "case fits within [an] exception of conduct
which so obviously violates [the] constitution that prior case law is
unnecessary."62 By the standards of the third category, every reasonable
officer would conclude that conduct exhibited in the case was
unreasonable without the need for case law. 63 This type of conduct
pertains to force that is "'wholly unnecessary to any legitimate law
enforcement purpose.'"64
C.

Modern Trend

To defeat qualified immunity under the modern approach, the
plaintiff must demonstrate two elements that courts may analyze in

42275-mcr_71-4 Sheet No. 138 Side B
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55. Id. 1159.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. (quoting Willingham v. Loughnan, 321 F.3d 1299 (11th Cir. 2003)).
60. Id. (noting that although "excessive force" is established as unconstitutional, the
concept itself is too broad and requires more specific delineation for officers to regulate
their conduct accordingly). The court noted that the "'reasoning, though not the holding' of
prior cases can also send 'the same message to reasonable officers' in novel factual
situations." Id. (quoting Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 743 (2002)).
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 1160.
64. Id. at 1159 (quoting Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188 (11th Cir. 2002)). See Lee, 284
F.3d 1188 (determining there was a Fourth Amendment violation for slamming a
handcuffed arrestee's head against a vehicle); see also Priester v. City of Riviera Beach,
208 F.3d 919, 926–27 (11th Cir. 2000) (denying qualified immunity where a police dog
was allowed to attack an arrestee lying on the ground).
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any order, given the circumstances of the case. 65 First, the plaintiff
"must establish that the defendant violated a constitutional right." 66
Second, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the right was clearly
established.67 A "clearly established" right has its contours defined so
that a reasonable official understands he is violating the right. 68 The
point is to give officials fair warning that their conduct was
unconstitutional.69 Officers' awareness of an existence of a right does
not mean officers knew their conduct violated that right; it must be
sufficiently clear that the official's actions on the scene infringed on the
right.70 Unless the plaintiff can establish a clear prior analogue,
"qualified immunity almost always protects the defendant." 71
In applying this approach, other circuits have dealt with cases where
officers targeted the subject of the arrest, but innocent bystanders were
hurt as a result.72 Overall, the modern trend applies qualified immunity
where officers used their discretionary authority to secure a delicate
scene for their own protection and for the protection of the public. 73
IV. COURT'S RATIONALE
A.

Majority

In Corbitt v. Vickers, the Eleventh Circuit was tasked with
determining whether an officer's application of force to an unintended
innocent bystander during an arrest operation violated the bystander's
clearly established Fourth Amendment right. 74 Because the case was
before the court on a denial of a motion to dismiss, the court relied on

42275-mcr_71-4 Sheet No. 139 Side A
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65. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009).
66. Griffin Indus., Inc. v. Irvin, 496 F.3d 1189, 1199–1200 (11th Cir. 2007).
67. Id.
68. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987).
69. Vaughan, 343 F.3d at 1332.
70. Coffin v. Brandau, 642 F.3d 999, 1015 (11th Cir. 2011).
71. See Oliver v. Fiorino, 586 F.3d 898, 907 (11th Cir. 2009) (quoting Priester, 208
F.3d at 926).
72. See Croom v. Balkwill, 645 F.3d 1240 (11th Cir. 2011); Bletz v. Gribble, 641 F.3d
743 (6th Cir. 2011); United States v. Maddox, 388 F.3d 1356 (10th Cir. 2004).
73. See Croom, 645 F.3d 1240 (granting qualified immunity where officers placed the
premises' occupants on the ground for several minutes to ensure no danger was present to
the officers or the public); Bletz, 641 F.3d 743 (determining that while officers were
allowed to temporarily detain innocent bystanders to execute a search warrant, a
reasonable jury could find a Fourth Amendment violation where the bystanders were
detained for an hour following a shooting); Maddox, 388 F.3d 1356 (holding the officers'
seizure of innocent bystanders as reasonable to secure the area and protect officers
against potential dangers).
74. See generally Vickers, 929 F.3d 1304.
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the allegations in the complaint taken in a light most favorable to the
plaintiff.75 Typically, an issue of qualified immunity is decided at the
summary judgment phase; however, it is proper to grant an officer's
motion to dismiss where the "'complaint fails to allege the violation of a
clearly established constitutional right.'" 76 For immunity to apply, its
application must balance holding officials accountable in the
irresponsible exercise of their power with "'the need to shield officials
from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their
duties reasonably.'"77 This balance protects "'all but the plainly
incompetent [officials or officials] who knowingly violate the law.'"78
The court first had to determine whether the plaintiff's constitutional
rights were violated and whether the plaintiff's rights were clearly
established at the time of the alleged violation. 79 The court relied on the
categories outlined in Mercado to explain the three ways a plaintiff may
show that the right was clearly established at the time of the
defendant's conduct.80 Further, to establish an excessive force violation,
a plaintiff must prove "'(1) that a seizure occurred and (2) that the force
used to effect the seizure was unreasonable.'" 81 Regarding the Fourth
Amendment,82 the court examined whether SDC was seized when
Vickers applied force while acknowledging that SDC's role did not fit
neatly into the traditional categories of analysis. 83 SDC was not the
target of an arrest, per the Fourth Amendment, nor an arrestee or
pretrial detainee, per the Fourteenth Amendment.84

42275-mcr_71-4 Sheet No. 139 Side B
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75. Vickers, 929 F.3d at 1311.
76. Id. (quoting St. George v. Pinellas Cty., 285 F.3d 1334, 1337 (11th Cir. 2002)). The
court also outlined the history of qualified immunity law to highlight both the purpose
and development of the defense as it pertained to this case. Id. The court reiterated
qualified immunity's history as protection for government officials performing
discretionary functions. Id.
77. Id. (quoting Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231).
78. Id. (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)).
79. Id.
80. Id. at 1312.
81. Id. at 1315 (quoting Troupe, 419 F.3d at 1166). The majority opinion here seems
to conflate whether there was a violation of rights with whether the right was clearly
established. It appears the opinion says no analogous case exists to indicate whether the
right was clearly established—where specific analogous facts are largely irrelevant.
Alternatively, the appropriate question for analyzing controlling facts is whether the right
was violated.
82. The court determined that the Fourteenth Amendment claim did not apply in this
case as SDC was not a pretrial detainee. See id. at 1313.
83. Id. at 1313.
84. Id.
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Best described as an "innocent bystander," SDC may still be
considered "seized" in light of the Fourth Amendment.85 Police restraint
on a person's individual freedom to walk away is enough to be
considered a seizure.86 The court featured several cases as examples of
courts determining that innocent bystanders were seized, 87 including
Croom v. Balkwill,88 United States v. Maddox,89 and Bletz v. Gribble.90
SDC was an innocent bystander playing in the yard when the subject of
the arrest wandered into the area. Everyone in the yard had been
ordered to the ground and instructed not to move before Vickers fired
his two shots, one of which hit SDC. This constituted a show of
authority by officers which restricted SDC's freedom of movement. 91
Therefore, SDC was seized in terms of the Fourth Amendment—but not
the Fourteenth—when Vickers fired the two shots.92
The court next had to consider the other prong of the test—whether
the force used to effectuate the seizure was unreasonable—to determine
whether SDC's established Fourth Amendment right was violated. 93
Implementing the Mercado framework, the court determined the case
did not fit into the first category (materially similar cases), because
there were no factually similar cases from the Supreme Court, from the
Eleventh Circuit, or from the Georgia Supreme Court. 94
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85. Id. The Fourth Amendment also governs seizures which do not result in formal
arrest or jail. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
86. Vickers, 929 F.3d at 1313.
87. Id. at 1314.
88. 645 F.3d 1240.
89. 388 F.3d 1356.
90. 641 F.3d 743.
91. Vickers, 929 F.3d at 1313.
92. Id. at 1314. The court regarded the example cases as factually similar to the
actions of Vickers. Id.
93. Id. at 1315.
94. Id. The court once again appears to conflate two Fourth Amendment tests by
conflating the Mercado framework with unreasonableness. Id. at 1314–15. The court
states that SDC's right to be free from excessive force was clearly established. Id. at 1314.
Then, under the next prong of the opinion—titled "Were Clearly Established Rights
Violated?"—the court proceeds to discuss whether Vickers's conduct was unreasonable
apropos (i.e. a violation of) SDC's "clearly established" rights. Id. at 1315. The
unreasonableness analysis takes place against the Mercado backdrop. Id. at 1315–22. The
court rejects the first two Mercado categories as guidance for unreasonable conduct by
stating "Corbitt has failed to demonstrate a clearly established Fourth Amendment
violation, either by the first method (a materially similar, binding case), or the second
method (the violation is a matter of obvious clarity from such a binding case)." Id. at
1320–21. The court rejects the third Mercado category stating, "the circumstances alleged
in this case do not so obviously violate the Fourth Amendment such that it would be
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The second category, concerning clearly established broader
principles, failed as well. 95 Although the district court sorted the case
under the second category, the Eleventh Circuit contended that the
justifying principle—that officers may not use excessive force—was too
broad.96 The controlling principle must be specific and particularized
per the exigencies of the case. 97 When performing a discretionary duty,
it can be difficult for an officer to determine the line between legal and
illegal. Thus, a clearly delineated rule, as opposed to a generalized rule,
allows officials to navigate the law with sufficient definiteness. 98
SDC was not the intended target of the arrest or the intended target
of Vickers's shots, resulting in a case of first impressions before the
court.99 There is no clearly established broader principle stating that
lethal force intended for one innocent bystander violates the Fourth
Amendment rights of another innocent bystander injured as a result of
the force.100 Further, the Supreme Court in Brower v. County of Inyo101
said that a Fourth Amendment violation depends on the "intentional
action on the part of the officer."102
The court, reciting Brower, noted that if an unoccupied, parked police
car slips its brakes, rolls down a hill, and pins a passerby, the officer
has likely committed a tort via his car but has not committed a Fourth
Amendment violation.103 There is still no Fourth Amendment violation
if the passerby ends up being a wanted serial killer as opposed to an
innocent citizen. Without drawing too fine a line, the Court in Brower
stated that the officer must intend to apply means of force used to effect
the injury.104 The Supreme Court concluded that "it [was] enough for a
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apparent to every reasonable officer that his actions were in violation of the Fourth
Amendment." Id. at 1322.
95. Id. at 1316–17.
96. Id. at 1315. See Post v. City of Ft. Lauderdale, 7 F.3d 1552, 1557 (11th Cir. 1993).
97. Vickers, 929 F.3d at 1316.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 1316–17.
101. 489 U.S. 593 (1989).
102. Vickers, 929 F.3d at 1317 (emphasis in original). The majority opinion does not
state what type of intent is necessary.
103. Id.
104. Id. (quoting Brower, 489 U.S. at 596–99).
In determining whether the means that terminates the freedom of movement
is the very means that the government intended we cannot draw too fine a line,
or we will be driven to saying that one is not seized who has been stopped by
the accidental discharge of a gun with which he was meant only to be
bludgeoned, or by a bullet in the heart that was meant only for the leg.
Brower, 489 U.S. at 598–99.
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seizure that a person be stopped by the very instrumentality set in
motion or put in place to achieve that result." 105 In examining the lower
courts that have interpreted Brower, the Eleventh Circuit concluded the
force would have to be intentionally applied to the target, as opposed to
accidentally applied, to constitute a Fourth Amendment violation. 106 No
case contends that a bystander suffers a Fourth Amendment violation
when an officer shoots at another object and hits the bystander. 107
Other Circuits—including the First, Second, Fourth, and Tenth—
have declined to extend Fourth Amendment protections to innocent
bystanders.108 Further, these circuits rarely consider bystanders to be
seized.109 Here, the Eleventh Circuit cited to Schultz v. Braga,110 in
which the Fourth Circuit found no Fourth Amendment violation when
an agent intended to shoot one individual and accidentally hit a
bystander,111 and contrasted that with the present case where the
target was a dog.112 Because there were no factually similar cases—
which may otherwise give rise to clearly established broader
principles—cited by the plaintiff, the present case did not fall within the
second Mercado category.113
The Eleventh Circuit also refused to find that no reasonable officer
would have fired at the dog, which would have invoked the third
Mercado category.114 Citing summarily to broadly analogous cases, 115
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105. Id.
106. Vickers, 929 F.3d at 1318.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 1319.
109. Id. at 1320.
110. 455 F.3d 470 (4th Cir. 2006). In Schultz, the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI) was looking for a man who had robbed a bank at gunpoint. A friend of the suspect—
an armed and dangerous drug addict—was cooperating with the FBI to apprehend the
suspect, tipping the agents off about when and where to find the suspect. FBI agents
apprehended what they thought was the correct vehicle—by happenstance, the vehicle
and its occupants just happened to have the same descriptions as those given to the FBI.
Agent Stowe approached the passenger side of the vehicle pointing his gun at the
passenger believed to be the suspect. After noticing the car was locked, Agent Stowe
ordered the passenger to unlock the car. Agent Braga approached as the passenger
reached to unlock the door and shot the passenger through the windshield, believing him
to have been reaching for a weapon. The Fourth Circuit found no Fourth Amendment
violation for the driver of the vehicle impacted by glass fragments from Agent Braga's
shot. Id. at 472–74, 483.
111. See id. at 483.
112. Vickers, 929 F.3d at 1320.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 1321.
115. Id.
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the court held that, while Vickers could have been more careful, his
conduct did not rise to the level of a Fourth Amendment violation. 116
Vickers's conduct was that of an accidental effect, not a misuse of
power.117 The court concluded that the complaint failed to plead facts
necessary to show that reasonable officers would have known that the
shot violated SDC's Fourth Amendment right. 118 Accordingly, Vickers
was entitled to qualified immunity. 119
B.

Dissent

Id.
Id. at 1321–22.
Id. at 1322–23.
Id. at 1323.
Id. (Wilson, J., dissenting)
Id. at 1325.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
766 F.3d 1262 (11th Cir. 2014).
Id. at 1265.
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116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
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Judge Wilson, dissenting, contended that the case fell into the third
category of the Mercado framework, because no competent officer would
have fired the shot.120 The officers ordered everyone in the area,
including six children, to the ground and held them at gunpoint. A
family pet was present but presented no threat, and there was no
suggestion that the pet acted with aggression or hostility toward
anyone, including the officers. Vickers, of his own accord, shot at the
pet, missed, waited, and shot again.121 While Vickers missed the dog for
the second time, Vickers struck a child who had been "lying within
arm's reach of the officer" the whole time.122
Vickers's conduct was "plainly unreasonable" in this context. 123 That
the pet was nonthreatening is crucial to the conclusion. 124 The Eleventh
Circuit has "consistently denied qualified immunity when the
defendant-officer exhibited excessive force in the face of no apparent
threat."125 Judge Wilson then pointed to Sanders v. Duke,126 where the
Eleventh Circuit wrote "[w]e have repeatedly ruled that a police officer
violates the Fourth Amendment, and is denied qualified immunity, if he
or she uses gratuitous and excessive force against a suspect who is
under control, not resisting, and obeying commands." 127 Further, the
dissent believed it was relevant to the decision that SDC was eighteen
inches from Vickers, determining no reasonable officer would shoot
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under those circumstances or even believe it lawful to do so.128
Accordingly, the dissent concluded that Vickers should not be entitled
to qualified immunity.129
V. IMPLICATIONS
The court in Vickers highlighted the distinction between an
accidental application of force and an intentional application of force
which ends up being applied to an unintended target. 130 The court
categorized Vickers as an accidental application of force issue.131 The
court reasoned that the shooting did not pertain to the seizure of SDC,
but rather the perception of officer safety, given the family pet's
proximity to the scene.132 The notable comparisons employed by the
court included an example of a police car accidentally rolling down a hill
and striking and killing an innocent bystander.133 This misapplication
of principles regarding intentionally applied force begged the question.
To make the analogy apt, the police officer would have had to roll his
own vehicle down the hill for the purpose of striking someone. 134 Other
circuits' examples given by the court were inapplicable as well. 135
In Vickers, the situation was docile and under control before the use
of force.136 Vickers intentionally applied lethal force to a nonlethal
situation.137 Vickers meant to shoot and did so twice with one child
eighteen inches in front of him and several more children in close
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128. Vickers, 929 F.3d at 1326.
129. Id.
130. See id.
131. Id. at 1320.
132. Id. at 1321.
133. Id. at 1317. If the innocent bystander principle is taken to its logical extreme,
then anyone who is not the subject of the arrest can be the victim of an officer's lethal
force with no recourse.
134. See Kit Kinports, The Supreme Court's Quiet Expansion of Qualified Immunity,
100 MINN. L. REV. Headnotes 62 (2016). This Article determines that the Supreme Court
is increasingly generous to defendants asserting qualified immunity and that the Court
refuses to acknowledge the departure from case law. Kinports further concludes that the
precedent of "clearly established law" can only be implemented by the Supreme Court,
and thus, each new constitutional suit presented to lower courts suffers a fatality for lack
of clearly establishing the law to the respective situation.
135. See, e.g., Schultz, 455 F.3d 470.
136. Vickers, 929 F.3d at 1308.
137. Vickers admits in his reply brief to the Eleventh Circuit that a non-violent and
non-aggressive dog does not need to be subdued and never contends that Bruce was
violent. Vickers instead insinuates that the dog's breed necessitated his lethal force. Reply
Brief of Appellant at 8, Vickers, 929 F.3d 1304 (No. 17-15566-DD).
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proximity.138 A plain viewing of the facts in Vickers situates the case in
the third category of the Mercado framework, conduct so obviously in
violation of the Fourth Amendment's purpose that prior case law is
unnecessary.139 Balancing accountability with discretionary job
functions, it is not unreasonable to expect an officer to know,
understand, and appreciate that if everyone is complying—there is no
threat of danger—then there is no need to use lethal force, especially on
those not the subject of the arrest.140 The dog's apprehension was not
essential, nor even relevant to the arrest operation. 141
This case represents a continued shift in how qualified immunity is
applied. Historically, the burden has been on the defendant to justify
why immunity applies.142 The modern trend, however, is to shift the
burden to the plaintiff to prove why the defense does not apply after the
defendant has asserted it. 143 As initially adopted, absolute immunity is
only for high government officials and state sovereigns. 144 Even the
term "absolute immunity" is misleading, though, because immunity is
not absolute if there are clearly defined scenarios where the official—
even presidents and legislators—cannot claim the immunity.145 By
applying immunity except where the plaintiff can show an incredibly
specific set of facts—ignoring a warning from the Court in Brower146—
the court in Vickers places an immense and problematic burden on the
plaintiff to defeat qualified immunity, because unique factual scenarios
which give rise to a constitutional violation occur ad infinitum.147
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138. Vickers cites to Vaughan in his reply brief to say that force is not accidental if
used to seize a suspect. Id. at 10. Vickers also claims that no authorities allow the
evaluation of reasonableness Id. at 7 n.2. Contrarily, Vickers cites to Vaughan once more
to contend that if an officer is using force to apprehend a suspect, then the court may
evaluate reasonableness Id. at 10. These two principles contradict each other. Either SDC
was not a suspect (as admitted in the case at hand), or SDC was actually considered a
suspect and thus reasonableness should have been evaluated. The two concepts are
mutually exclusive.
139. Vickers, 929 F.3d at 1325.
140. Vickers notes in his Appellant brief that the appropriate action would be to
subdue the dog with a taser or pepper spray, then confirms later that he chose to use his
gun instead of either of those two options. Brief for Appellant at 11, Vickers, 929 F.3d
1304 (No. 17-15566-DD).
141. Vickers, 929 F.3d at 1308.
142. See Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 239; see also Butz, 438 U.S. 478.
143. See Vickers, 929 F.3d at 1311.
144. See Spalding, 161 U.S. 483.
145. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1.
146. Brower, 489 U.S. at 598–99.
147. Corbitt's attorney contends that police are not going to be aware of highly
specified fact patterns. The police are "in the trenches, not studying case law." Telephone
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Qualified immunity now approximates or surpasses absolute
immunity.148
The court in Vickers also shifts the burden of proof. When applying
immunity to judges, prosecutors, jurors, and the like, the party
asserting the defense had to explain why the defense applied and why
public policy to hold officials accountable should not outweigh the
defense.149 The new shift in burden of proof contradicts judicial
standards of having a party justify its own argument to the court. 150
Critiquing the expansion of qualified immunity and the shifting of
burdens is not to say that police officers should have no form of
institutionalized protections, but details matter. Courts should return
to the founding principles of American jurisprudence and make the
parties justify their own claims. 151 Often, defendants have more access
to their own evidence than the plaintiff. 152 Here, the Plaintiff was
required to not only prove her own case, but to disprove applicability of
qualified immunity via the complaint.153 Even first-year law students
are repeatedly told that the burden of an "affirmative defense" rests on
the defendant. While burden-shifting may not solve all of the qualified
immunity problems and issues of police violence, this control
mechanism will help achieve a result more consistent with
constitutional protections and legislative intent—a form of "imperfect
justice."154
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Interview with Ashleigh Madison, Plaintiff's Attorney, Southeast Law, LLC (Oct. 1, 2019).
Therefore, the police need broader principles than the court is mandating here. Id. With
complete insulation, law enforcement lacks its own form of law enforcement by stripping
the checks and balances of the system. Rogue officers insulated from recourse provide an
entirely new problem that § 1983 was designed to rectify. Id.
148. Jacob Sullum, A License for Outrageous Police Conduct, REASON.COM (Sept. 25,
2019, 12:15 AM), https://reason.com/2019/09/25/a-license-for-outrageous-police-conduct/
(article highlighting several case examples where the court's decision to apply qualified
immunity shocks the conscience).
149. Butz, 428 U.S. at 506.
150. This is true for parties asserting affirmative defenses in both civil and criminal
cases. A question ripe for analysis is whether the judiciary is pursuing the same goal the
purpose of qualified immunity aims to achieve if the burden of proof is on the person filing
the original claim, not the person asserting the defense.
151. Interview with Sujata Gadkar-Wilcox, Associate Professor of Legal Studies,
Quinnipiac University (Oct. 24, 2019).
152. Id.
153. See Vickers, 929 F.3d 1304. See also Wooten, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 199826. The
district court recommended that the record proceed for factual development, much of
which was to be presented by Vickers to provide a clear understanding of the case's
exigencies concerning Bruce. Id.
154. Interview with Sujata Gadkar-Wilcox, Associate Professor of Legal Studies,
Quinnipiac University (Oct. 24, 2019). For a more in-depth discussion of imperfect justice,
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Extending qualified immunity jurisprudence along its current
vector—exempting all officials exercising discretion from personal
liability under the Constitution—eliminates the Constitutional
protections and provides citizens with no redress for violations
thereof.155 Such an extension and interpretation is in direct violation of
Congressional intent, legislated through § 1983.156 Congress created
§ 1983 as a vehicle for litigating constitutional infringements at the
hands of state agents so citizens would have recourse for their
injuries.157 By finding a multitude of avenues to expand the reach of
qualified immunity, courts are acting against congressional intent and
effectively nullifying the Fourth Amendment protections guaranteed by
the Constitution and by Congress.158
One avenue where this extension has already played out is the Feres
doctrine.159 While combat officials are exempt through absolute
immunity, the Feres doctrine extends the liability shield to noncombat
officials like military doctors.160 The Feres doctrine extends the same
justifications for shielding officials as qualified immunity: preventing
frivolous suits, inconvenience, and interference with discretion.161
Immunity for combat officials makes sense because of the immediacy
and gravitas of wartime discretion. Noncombat military officials do not
have the immediacy and gravitas of war, meaning no reasonable
justification to extend the shield to noncombat officials exists—unless
the Feres doctrine and qualified immunity are just about not wanting to
pay the money.162 Military doctors ought to be deterred from engaging
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see Amartya Sen, THE IDEA OF JUSTICE (Allen Lane & Harvard Univ. Press, 2009)
(critiquing the transcendental theory of justice proposed by John Rawls in favor of a
comparative analysis on the merits of practical realities).
155. Baude, supra note 8, at 81 (contending that the Court modifies the doctrine to the
point where it is seemingly unstable and can be manipulated at any time). See, e.g.,
Pearson, 555 U.S. at 223 (2009); Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001); Harlow, 457 U.S. at
818–19. The Article further emphasizes that the Court gives special treatment to
qualified immunity on its docket. Baude, supra note 8, at 82.
156. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
157. Id.
158. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
159. See Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
160. Id.
161. Leo Shane III, Supreme Court rejects bid to overturn prohibition on military
malpractice
cases,
MILITARY
TIMES,
(May
20,
2019)
https://www.militarytimes.com/news/pentagon-congress/2019/05/20/supreme-court-rejectsbid-to-overturn-prohibition-on-military-malpractice-cases/.
162. Brenda Breslauer, U.S. service members can't sue military doctors. A terminally
NEWS,
ill
Green
Beret
is
fighting
to
change
that.,
NBC
https://www.nbcnews.com/health/health-care/u-s-soldiers-can-t-sue-military-doctors-
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in medical practice. In a scathing dissent concerning the Supreme
Court's decision to not hear another servicemember's case, Justice
Thomas—with whom Justice Ginsburg agreed—wrote that "[s]uch
unfortunate repercussions—denial of relief to military personnel and
distortions of other areas of law to compensate—will continue to ripple
through our jurisprudence as long as the Court refuses to reconsider
Feres."163
Further, the balance between allowing officials to perform their
discretionary duties and holding officials accountable will be upset if
the trend is not reversed.164 Officials would not be deterred from
committing constitutional wrongs. Deterrence has already weakened as
officers need not justify their actions via the qualified immunity
defense, but rather, the plaintiff must justify her own case, and prove
the defense wrong.165 Furthermore, as noted in Butz, there would be no
statutory compensation for victims either as "the Tort Claims Act
prohibits recovery for injuries stemming from discretionary acts, even
when that discretion has been abused." 166 The doctrinal shift of
immunity as a whole adulterates the protections once applied to elite
government officials.
No man in this country is so high that he is above the law. No officer
of the law may set that law at defiance with impunity. All the officers
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terminally-ill-n1070516 (last visited Nov. 13, 2019). Department of Defense officials—
testifying on Capital Hill in May—justified the immunity by arguing that servicemembers
already have their insurance paid for by the federal government, thus they are already
compensated. Retired Major General John D. Altenburg said military readiness would be
disrupted by litigation, and extra medical tests would be too expensive and distracting for
servicemembers. Id.
163. Daniel v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1713 (2019) (ordering denial of petition for
certiorari) (Thomas, J. dissenting). Recently, Sgt. 1st Class Richard Stayskal challenged
the Feres doctrine after military doctors failed to detect his cancer for months prior to
diagnosis by a civilian doctor—the cancer was fatal by the time it was discovered.
Breslauer, supra note 162.
164. State agents have responsibility to society. The agents are empowered to take
action because society believes such action is beneficial. Alternatively, the more discretion
state agents are given, the more opportunities there are to abuse such discretion.
Therefore, restraints on a state agent's discretionary authority are necessary to curtail
opportunities for abusive temptation.
165. See, e.g., Lech v. Jackson, 791 Fed. Appx. 771 (10th Cir. 2019) (determining that
homeowners are not entitled to compensation under the Takings Clause where police blow
up the homeowner's residence for public safety preservation).
166. Butz, 438 U.S. at 505.
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of the government, from the highest to the lowest, are creatures of
the law, and are bound to obey it.167

Ultimately, the judicially invented doctrine of qualified immunity
has mutated throughout the iterations of courts, resulting in a
metamorphosis from a narrow and limited protection founded in the
Constitution to a shield protecting behavior of those who have been
known to frequently abuse their power in the most vulnerable
moments.168 The assumption that all behavior is okay until a victim of a
constitutional violation proves otherwise is a pertinent factor of the
police brutality in society.169 By over-institutionalizing and expanding
police protections beyond reasonable means, an underwritten,
systematic approval of police brutality begins to form.170 Creation of
such a powerful, and dangerous, doctrine may be considered judicial
legislation, now engraved in jurisprudence under a guise of stare
decisis.171

Jameson M. Fisher
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167. United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 220 (1882).
168. See Sims v. Labowitz, 885 F.3d 254 (4th Cir. 2018) (denying qualified immunity
for an officer who forced a minor to masturbate in front of police as part of the
investigation).
169. See, e.g., "Woman shot and killed by police officer in her own home" CNN,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zzYizoixDnw.
170. See, e.g., Roberto Kant De Lima, BUREAUCRATIC RATIONALITY IN BRAZIL AND IN
THE UNITED STATES: CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE. IN:
Roberto Da Matta & David Hess, THE BRAZILIAN PUZZLE: CULTURE ON THE BORDERLANDS
OF THE WESTERN WORLD 241–269 (Columbia Univ. Press, 1st ed. 1995). The case study of
Rio de Janeiro demonstrates a larger history of the institutionalization of police violence
due to a lack of accountability. Id. The efficacy of control mechanisms—such as
legislation, standards of conduct, internal oversight, and the judiciary—is tethered to the
relationship between police and citizens. Id. New controls or improvements on current
mechanisms recalibrate the relationship and promotes consanguinity. Id.
171. See Baude, supra note 8, at 45.

